"Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau"

If only that would be true...

Blatant signs are for a classic bubble forming on the Icelandic stock exchange - again! Since the beginning of the year, stock prices have practically reached a lift-off speed and defied the market's law of gravity.

The stock index in the Icelandic stock exchange. Taken from Keldan.is. Click to enlarge.

Why this happens one can only speculate about but a not so unlikely spark is the existence of the capital controls which prevent the Johns and Jonases of Iceland to take their money out of the economy. Investors are therefore locked in, searching for investment opportunities in despair.

Many have parked their money in the banking system with its government backup. Others have funded the increased stock of bonds - especially government bonds as touched upon here - but the market value of registered bonds has risen up to 2,160 billion ISK from 1,390 billion ISK in October 2008. The yield of government bonds has dropped significantly as well, dipping below the yield which would neutralise the actuarial calculations of the Icelandic pension funds but they control around 55% of the total worth of registered bonds in the Icelandic stock exchange. Something tells me that the Icelandic pension funds may not be so eager to hold the too-low-yield-for-them bonds anymore once they will be allowed to invest again abroad.

Other trapped investors have decided to jump on the equities bandwagon, especially after the media began to show the price developments on the stock market some interest (such as here, here, here and here).  Like you can count on women flocking to the shops of Paris during the "soldes" period, investors followed the crowd and poured money into the stock market: the turnover of stocks in the first days of the year 2013 was fivefold the average turnover in 2012. Can anybody smell the "permanency" of this newly found stock plateau?

Nothing lasts forever, all stock runs run out in the long run. But who cares about the long run anyway! In the long run we're all dead and today's politicians (and Lords of Finance) will have managed to throw the burden of steering the economy away from recreating the financial turmoil of 2008 onto somebody else's new and unexpected shoulders. And of course the poor soul who is unlucky enough to be in command at the time of the burst of the bubble will take all the blame.

So jump on the bandwagon, enjoy the Beauty Contest and make money beyond your wildest dreams. Just don't come running back to me when you lose them all.

The Rate of Interest and the Nominal Monetary Target

Jeffrey Frankel's article "The Death of Inflation Targeting" and my comment on a Facebook link of a friend to it are the soil of this post. In the comment I said that it was a shame people did not understand that the classical/neoclassical/Austrian theory of rate of interest being the price of waiting to spend your money was wrong. I was asked to clarify better what (the Hell!) I meant and how it was connected to the Death of Inflation Targeting. 

The classical theory of rate of interest
Most of us and all of us who went for Econ 101 know this theory. Higher interest rates spur people to save higher part of their income and at the same time those same rates cause investment, which is funded with the savings of people (savings must come first, investment follows... also incorrect but that matter is somewhat out of the reach of this post), to decrease as rates becomes higher. In "equilibrium" the savings and investment schedules meet and that is where the rate of interest and amount of savings and investment is decided.

The well-known supply-demand diagram of how interest rates are decided according to the amount of savings and investment in the economy.



This is the static theory of rate of interest: rates get higher and people will save more, no questions asked. This is of course nonsense, otherwise how would one explain situations like this one?

A question in a survey I asked people to participate in. Higher rates don't seem that interesting if you cannot access your money. Obviously, the number of responds might not be significant enough, but you get the point: higher rates don't necessarily mean that people jump automatically on that bandwagon as the static theory of rate of interest implies. 

 

The classical dynamic version is that people ask for the rate of interest because they are willing to wait for that price (rate of interest) for their chance to spend their money. The longer you wait the higher rates you will get. Interest rates are the price of time according to this theory. This seems like the most accepted view of most economists and it’s an old one. It is essentially built on the idea that interest rates are decided on where the marginal disutility of waiting to consume (save) is equal to the marginal productivity of capital (I’m not going to get into how flawed the terms “marginal disutility of savings” and “marginal productivity of capital” are).

Hayek (Austrian) held that interest rates reflected the collective (market) preference of individuals to consume now rather than later. If people wanted to consume now, interest rates would have to be high in order to get them to save part of their income until they could use it and the accrued interests for consumption later.

Mises (Austrian) was of the same opinion: “Interest is the difference in the valuation of present goods and future goods; it is the discount in the valuation of future goods as against that of present goods” and “The greater the fund of means of subsistence in a community, the lower the rate of interest.”

Hicks (neo-Keynesian, the one who thought he grasped Keynes’s General Theory in the IS-LM model but apologised for his faults later): “There are other instruments of economic policy which can attain the same objective as a rise in interest rates; and some of these may well be less destructive instruments. But we should not forget that in these days of scarcity time is short; and the rate of interest is the price of time.” (1947, ‘World Recovery After War – A Theoretical Analysis’ my emphasis).

Marshall (neoclassical): “Interest, being the price paid for the use of capital in any market, tends towards an equilibrium level such that the aggregate demand for capital in that market, at that rate of interest, is equal to the aggregate stock forthcoming at that rate”.

So the rate of interest is the price of waiting according to the classical/neoclassical/Austrian theory. A rather convenient corollary of this – note especially the latter quote from Mises – seems to be that the only thing needed to decrease the rate of interest in the economy is to get the public to save more: if the public increases its savings, the supply of investment-funds increases and, given the same investment schedule, the rate of interest lowers and investment increases exactly by the same amount of increased savings.

This view of the origin of rate of interest has never been proven to apply in practice. And it is of course very very flawed once one takes a step back and thinks about it.

“This is a nonsense theory”
Keynes declined the classical theory out of the simple observation that it was inconsistent with the assumptions it rested on:

The independent variables of the classical theory of the rate of interest are the demand curve for capital and the influence of the rate of interest on the amount saved out of a given income; and when (e.g.) the demand curve for capital shifts, the new rate of interest, according to this theory, is given by the point of intersection between the new demand curve for capital and the curve relating the rate of interest to the amounts which will be saved out of the given income. The classical theory of the rate of interest seems to suppose that, if the demand curve for capital shifts or if the curve relating the rate of interest to the amounts saved out of a given income shifts or if both these curves shift, the new rate of interest will be given by the point of intersection of the new positions of the two curves. But this is a nonsense theory. For the assumption that income is constant is inconsistent with the assumption that these two curves can shift independently of one another. If either of them shift, then, in general, income will change; with the result that the whole schematism based on the assumption of a given income breaks down. (from the General Theory, Chapter 14, my underlining)

So Keynes had to come up with another theory since he realised the classical theory was useless for the simple fact that one cannot both eat the cake and keep it.

Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of Rate of Interest
Keynes’s LPT was based on the sober observation that savings could be kept in many different forms. It wasn’t the amount of savings that decided the rate of interest, as in the classical/neoclassical/Austrian theory, but the form which the savings were kept in. 1,000 euros kept in cash are just as much of savings as 1,000 euros kept in corporate bonds. If people were willing to shift from one form to the other, interest rates would change. How people saved mattered, not the amount they saved.

A simple way to show the subtle difference is hopefully the following. A man has 1,000 euros in after-tax income. He spends 900 of them in living expenses (consumption) and the rest is savings.

Now the question he must ask himself is the following: “will I possibly need the 100 euros I’ve saved this month in case something happens in the near future that calls for unexpected expenditures that I cannot meet with my regular after-tax income? If so, I need to keep the savings in a form which I can easily access to meet the unexpected expenditures. If not, I can keep the savings in a form that could possibly take me days or years to access.”

If the man thinks he needs the cash in near future, he will keep it in liquid form, such as cash, which yields no rate of interst, or a demand-deposit bank account which he can withdraw the money from any time he wants. But at the same time, the demand-deposit account has very low rate of interest.

If the man thinks he doesn’t need the cash, he’s OK with keeping it in illiquid form that takes him days to get into the type of wealth he can spend on consumption, i.e. cash. One such form is time-deposit bank account which he cannot withdraw the money from until sometime later. This is beneficial for him as the time-deposit account has very high rate of interest in comparison to the demand-deposit account.

Notice the very subtle difference: no matter how he decides to keep his savings (20 euros in the demand-deposit bank account and 80 in the time-deposit account or 50 in each...) he will always save the same amount! The rate of interest does not influence the amount he saves but only how he saves it – how much goes into the immediately accessible but low interest rate demand-deposit bank account in comparison to the ill-accessible but high interest rate time-deposit account.

So the rate of interest is not the price of waiting to consume (to save) but the price of our willingness to depart with the ability to use our money in case something unexpected happens. Interest rates are, as Skidelsky called it, the price we are willing to accept for losing our “instant command over sums of money.”

A wonderful corollary to this fact is that the Central Bank can, and should, influence not only the short term rate of interest downwards but the long-term rates as well. It does this by securing full liquidity in the market for public-debt instruments of all maturities. Doing so, the public can be as liquid as it wants and the rate of interest will decrease.

The Future Nominal Monetary Target?
It is here where the “Death of the Inflation Target” plays its part. The inflation target was built on the classical, and wrong, theory of the origin of the rate of interest. More importantly, the majority of central bank theorists have not accepted what market makers have been knowledgeable about for a very long time: money is endogenously created at the same time as credit is but not exogenously (the textbook helicopter model): money does not come first and then credit but credit-demand first and then credit-creation and money-creation at the same time. And it is the Endogeneity of money that creates the asset boom-and-bust cycle.

Blatantly, as the Austrians realised (although they used the wrong theory of interest to reach that conclusion) and Keynes as well, if the rate of interest is lower than the marginal efficiency of capital, a bank credit-driven investment boom and bubble will commence. But at the same time, the rate of interest must be kept low in order to fuel investment demand and thereby labour demand. High interest rates kill off productive investment that would have otherwise lowered the unemployment and increased production in the economy. Low enough interest rates – as low or lower than the marginal efficiency of capital – would almost definitely secure full employment in the economy, permanently.

The problem that arises from a situation where interest rates are lower than the marginal efficiency of capital is the threat of a credit boom with all the accompanying money creation and demand that will hit supply-constraints resulting in the inevitable: high inflation.

But the remedy against this is to keep the endogenous nature of money on a short leash. Money in a modern economy is created by the banking system sidelong the creation of credit and debt. If the credit creation capabilities of the banking system are kept under control, not with high rates of interest – for dear money does not automatically mean that money will not be easy – but with direct control of how much credit it can give, the credit boom problem is solved. If those limitations are put into place, there is no chance that credit-driven investment bubble can form with the resulting inflation unless the funds come from abroad.

But foreign inflow of funds into an economy means that the nominal exchange rate of the currency will strengthen. Stronger exchange rate means lower exports and shift from domestically manufactured goods to imports, resulting in a decrease in employment. Full employment in an economy where the Endogeneity of money is kept on a short leash does not go along with too strong exchange rate. At the same time, too low exchange rate means imports-inflation.

Somewhere, there is a wonderful but ever-changing balance in the exchange rate which is weak enough to secure full employment but not so weak that it causes overinvestment, credit-fuelled expansion of money supply and imports-inflation.

The future monetary target should be to keep interest rates low at all times with full liquidity provision of the central bank, fulfilling the public’s demand for liquidity – i.e. full access to their wealth – at all times. At the same time, in order to stop bank-credit fuelled investment booms-and-busts from forming, the credit creation capabilities of the banking system should be limited in such a way that the limitations are directly influencing the banking system to reach full employment and low inflation at the same time through balancing the exchange rate.

Nota bene: this exchange rate would be a free-market solution restrained only by the rules the central bank puts into place regarding credit creation. At the same time, the central bank influences the rate of interest downwards in order to reach the rather socially and economically well acceptable target of full employment through private investment projects.

Is Keynes's Clearing Union the Solution for Europe?

The Wolfson Economics Prize, about how to fix/break up the euro, was in the news some weeks ago. After having skimmed through, certainly not read thoroughly, some of the works that were handed in (I did read the entry of the 10 year old Dutch kid, thumbs up for trying) and with this paper in mind - A post-Keynesian interpretation of the eurozone crisis - it has started started to dawn upon me that Keynes may well have the solution: his Clearing Union (CU).

The essential core of the CU was that (current account) surpluses were to be recycled, in a way, between countries. The surpluses would build up as "pool of funds" (don't think for a second that I believe in the nonsense of Loanable Funds Theory just because I use this term) at the Clearing Union. Those surpluses would then be available to countries in deficits in the form of overdraft facility, at very low rate of interest. In today's Europe, the equivalents of the surplus countries are of course Germany and other current account surplus countries. The Peripheries are the deficits countries.

If the CU would be adopted between the countries of the euro zone the surplus of the Core would be up for grabs for the Peripheries, at a very low rate of interest. The Peripheries could therefore finance employment schemes and public investment projects with money from the Core, hoping that the resulting increase in income would get the economy back on track and possibly even getting some capital-and-income convergence with the Core.

In the meanwhile, the Surplus countries would be induced to spend more at the given exchange rate of the euro since the rate of interest of the surplus, ending up being a overdraft facility at the CU, is very low. The increased spending of surpluses would, if spent outside the euro zone, send the exchange rate down, assisting the deficit countries to export their way out of recession. If the spending is euro-zone-internal the increased income of the peripheries, as the surplus is recycled into imports from there into the core, would kick them out of recession.

Note that this system basically fights against huge disbalances in the current account between countries. Today's problem arise from the fact that even though the current account of the euro zone as a whole may be in balance to the rest of the world, there are huge imbalances between countries within the euro zone. This CU system would wipe those imbalances out or at least mitigate their negative effects as the deficits can be financed at low rate of interest.

The beauty of this CU system is that there doesn't seem to be any need to breakup the euro. Obviously, the creditor countries (the Core) are being asked to spend their own money to clear up the internal imbalances. If they don't want to do that, the debtor countries (the Peripheries) get the savings at a very low rate and can do what they want with it. No need for fiscal union.

I don't expect this idea to reach the ears of ruling politicians however, they are already "slaves to some defunct economist" who thinks the way out of the current problems is to apply more and more austerity. One can only hope they realise that it's like trying to put out fire with a dash of petrol.

Banks: intermediaries or money-creators?

Peter Radford has a comment about whether banks are intermediaries or not on the Real World Economics blog, answering my comment where I say Krugman is disastrously wrong in his Banking Mysticism post. His comment is:

"I have just returned from depositing some cash in my local bank. An insignificant amount to be sure, but not the result of my being loaned to by that bank.

So.

Was that deposit a loanable funds sum? Is my bank an intermediary? Or is my deposit simply a recycled amount originating, way back, from a loan? If so, are the decisions of depositors like me completely irrelevant to an understanding of banking? Is that cash not really mine after all, and merely part of a giant flow from one bank to another? Did my decision have no macroeconomic effect?

I agree Krugman ignores – apparently – endogenous money creation. But banks gather deposits as fast as they can? Why? If they can simply create money why would I, as a banker, ever waste my time building branches to attract deposits? Why would I raise or lower interest rates to “attract deposits” if I never needed to?

Chick, in her book “Macroeconomics After Keynes”, pages 236-240, describes a difference between a “banking system” and an older, less sophisticated “bank”. She argues that the notion of being a ‘savings conduit’ (i.e. an intermediary) is outmoded once banking becomes so intertwined it can be called a system. She tries to make a great deal of this.

The issue, it appears is causation: does savings drive investment; or does investment drive savings? Chick sits squarely in the latter camp because of her Keynesian view, while Krugman seems muddled and appears to tend towards the former.

My life as a banker for 20 years would have been a whole lot more simple had I known that I was not running an intermediary. At least in part.

It appears to me – naively obviously – that banking is more complicated than either side in the Keen – Krugman discussion implies. Banks clearly create money. They recycle it too. And that recycling is called intermediation. Which, in turn, can be called being a conduit for savings.

Is this another case of two tribes not wanting to concede that there may be a middle ground?"

There is no middle ground
I am going to argue that there is no middle ground: banks are creators of money, in all instances.

First, transforming cash into bank deposit has, effectively, no effect on your net holdings of money-type assets. Cash is money just as bank deposit is accepted as such. However, there  is a great difference in cash-money and deposits-money in the sense that one of them is vulnerable for sudden lack of trust when depositors don't believe anymore to be able to use the bank deposit as money. That is when we see a classic bank run: people are despairingly trying to SELL their bank deposit to the bank itself and BUY cash instead. And the price therebetween is 1:1.

But that's exactly what you do when you take your cash-money to the bank, just the other way around. You sell it to the bank and instead the bank gives you a bank deposit, which is usable as money, and you get tiny rate of interest on it as well. As long as you think you can access your bank deposit whenever you want to use it as money, you're ok with that deal.

Note also that the rate of interest on the deposit is (should) be lower than the policy rates, which is the price of liquidity assistance from the central bank. The bank will be happy to buy the cash from you and sell you low interest deposit instead, not to lend the cash out (intermediary) but to fulfil either regulatory minimums or bank-specific needs regarding liquid assets. Those liquid assets can be the cash itself (the Austrian dream of 100% reserve requirement ratio) or the bank can sell the cash you just brought in to another bank or even the central bank itself and get liquid (central bank or other bank) deposit instead.

The question each economic unit has to ask himself is how liquid he wants to be. Cash is the utmost liquid asset and you can, as Keynes realised and built his Liquidity-Preference theory on, use it to store your wealth if you do not trust any other assets to hold your wealth in or if you want to make a speculative move on the price of other assets (you standing in the bank-run queue is essentially a speculation on your behalf: you think your bank-deposit asset will collapse in value and therefore you are trying to sell it to get more liquid asset, cash, instead in which you prefer at that moment to store your wealth in).

So when you brought the cash-money into the bank, you indeed had macroeconomic effect: you lowered the rate of interest (by obviously such a low amount it wasn't noticed but I hope you get my point) as you accepted an asset (bank deposit) that is not as liquid as cash. You selling your cash to the bank is a sign of your liquidity-preference being lower than when you held the cash.

My point is that banks are not intermediaries: you are not depositing your cash-money in the bank for it to lend it out to another person, you are selling your highly-liquid cash-money to the bank for not-as-liquid bank-deposit. The bank may well sell the cash you sold to it to the central bank for a liquid central-bank deposit or buy a much more illiquid CDS contract or whatever not, it hinges on the liquidity preference of the bank you just sold the cash to. And since this is a question of liquidity-preference of units but not intermediary process, the banks will ALWAYS create deposits parallel to creating bank-loans. Those deposits are then spent on other assets, both financial and non-financial, but they are always somebody's financial-liability in the system, no matter how you store that wealth, i.e. purchasing power.

An obvious problem that arises from this is "when is a financial asset money?" How the newly created deposit is spent makes a difference on how much "money" ends up in the system. Do you spend it on a savings account (thereby moving a time-deposit, which is M1, into M3)? Or do you spend it on Treasuries? Or corporate bonds? Or stocks?

This was a problem that Keynes realised in the GT but he, as far as my knowledge goes, never addressed it properly but simply said (in footnote no. 66): "...we can draw the line between "money" and "debts" at whatever point is most convenient for handling a particular problem. For example, we can treat as money any command over general purchasing power which the owner has not parted with for a period in excess of three months, and as debt what cannot be recovered for a longer period than this; or we can substitute for "three months" one month or three days or three hours or any other period; or we can exclude from money whatever is not legal tender on the spot. It is often convenient in practice to include in money time-deposits with banks and, occasionally, even such instruments as (e.g.) treasury bills."

To my knowledge, Treasury bills and Treasuries are generally not included in official money supply measurements.  But that's where bank-deposits, created parallel to bank loans, can end up if the owner of the deposit so chooses. Obviously, we can put "CDS contracts" or "stocks" or any other financial instrument in there as well according to this "definition" of money. And that is suddenly not "money" any more, even thought the debt and the deposit were created at some time in the past.

So banks are not intermediaries, not even partially so. They are simply, as Schumpeter so blatantly stated it, creators of purchasing power.

Excerpts from the General Theory by Keynes

I've been reading the General Theory by Keynes due to the "policy chapter" (working title) of my PhD thesis. I had only read chapter 12 before but now that I'm working my way properly through book IV of the GT (chapters 11 to 18 on The Inducement to Invest) I realise what sort of genius Keynes was. Here are some excerpts, only from chapters 11 and 12 (I don't have much time and the number of quotes would grow quickly if I would include chapters 13-18, especially from chapter 13 where the liquidity-preference theory of rate of interest is introduced):

Chapter 11 - The Marginal Efficiency of Capital
"The most important confusion concerning the meaning and the significance of the marginal efficiency of capital has ensued on the failure to see that it depends on the prospective yield of capital, and not merely on its current yield."

"It is important to understand the dependency of the marginal efficiency of capital of a given stock of capital on changes in expectation, because it is chiefly this dependence which renders the marginal efficiency of capital subject to the somewhat violent fluctuations which are the explanation of the Trade Cycle."

"The schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is of fundamental importance because it is mainly through this factor (much more than through the rate of interest) that the expectation of the future influences the present. The mistake in regarding the marginal efficiency of capital primarily in terms of the current yield of capital equipment, which would be correct only in the static state where there is no changing future to influence the present, has had the result of breaking the theoretical link between today and tomorrow... The fact that assumptions of the static state often underlie present-day economic theory, imports into it a large element of unreality."

Chapter 12 - The State of Long-Term Expectations
"It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain. It is  reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively relevant to the issue than other facts about which out knowledge is vague and scanty. For this reason the facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the formation of our long-term expectations; our usual practice being to take the existing situation and to project it into the the future, modified only to the extent that we have more or less definite reasons for expecting a change.

The state of long-term expectations, upon which our decisions are based, does not solely depend, therefore, on the most probable forecast we can make. It also depends on the confidence with which we make this forecast - on how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong."

"If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence."

Factor no. 4 of how we form the expectations of the future and on what they are based on deserves to be quoted at full length. Keynes's own italics are still there but my emphasises are underlined:


"(4) But there is one feature in particular which deserves our attention. It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgement and knowledge beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public. They are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who buys it “for keeps”, but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence. Moreover, this behaviour is not the outcome of a wrong-headed propensity. It is an inevitable result of an investment market organised along the lines described. For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an investment of which you believe the prospective yield to justify a value of 30, if you also believe that the market will value it at 20 three months hence.


Thus the professional investor is forced to concern himself with the anticipation of impending changes, in the news or in the atmosphere, of the kind by which experience shows that the mass psychology of the market is most influenced. This is the inevitable result of investment markets organised with a view to so-called “liquidity”. Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding of “liquid” securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole. The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most skilled investment to-day is “to beat the gun”, as the Americans so well express it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow.


This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation a few months hence, rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years, does not even require gulls amongst the public to feed the maws of the professional; — it can be played by professionals amongst themselves. Nor is it necessary that anyone should keep his simple faith in the conventional basis of valuation having any genuine long-term validity. For it is, so to speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical Chairs — a pastime in which he is victor who says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passes the Old Maid to his neighbour before the game is over, who secures a chair for himself when the music stops. These games can be played with zest and enjoyment, though all the players know that it is the Old Maid which is circulating, or that when the music stops some of the players will find themselves unseated.


Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.


If the reader interjects that there must surely be large profits to be gained from the other players in the long run by a skilled individual who, unperturbed by the prevailing pastime, continues to purchase investments on the best genuine long-term expectations he can frame, he must be answered, first of all, that there are, indeed, such serious-minded individuals and that it makes a vast difference to an investment market whether or not they predominate in their influence over the game-players. But we must also add that there are several factors which jeopardise the predominance of such individuals in modern investment markets. Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the crowd how the crowd will behave; and, given equal intelligence, he may make more disastrous mistakes. There is no clear evidence from experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides with that which is most profitable. It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of time and our ignorance of the future than to beat the gun. Moreover, life is not long enough; — human nature desires quick results, there is a peculiar zest in making money quickly, and remoter gains are discounted by the average man at a very high rate. The game of professional investment is intolerably boring and over-exacting to anyone who is entirely exempt from the gambling instinct; whilst he who has it must pay to this propensity the appropriate toll. Furthermore, an investor who proposes to ignore near-term market fluctuations needs greater resources for safety and must not operate on so large a scale, if at all, with borrowed money — a further reason for the higher return from the pastime to a given stock of intelligence and resources. Finally it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is in the essence  of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally."

"We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of irrational psychology. On the contrary, the state of long-term expectation is often steady, and, even when it is not, the other factors exert their compensating effects. We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance."

And today's economic theory?
What I must admit finding amazing is that all that is written here above doesn't take a genius to write (although Keynes certainly was). I cannot help to feel that the meaning of the text here above can be agreed to be in some sense true by any commonly intelligent human being. That same human being would at the same time quite likely to be able to convey the meaning of this text to another person, maybe not using those exact words but conveying its meaning and feeling all the same. This is truly nothing more than common sense.

Nevertheless, today's economic theory is nothing of this sort. Just as an example, uncertainty about the future does not exist in today's ruling macroeconomic theory. It is disturbing how far away from the real world the ruling paradigm of economic theory is.

And is it any wonder, seeing today's ruling economics theory where the sensible economics of Keynes is completely and patently ignored with fully informed economic agents who take decisions based on "rational" expectations where there is no uncertainty about the future course of events, that we are in a world of economic mess?